After Haindl, Prior to Nuland in Skopje: Few Warnings

One year after “Przhino”, the situation in Macedonia is more or less similar: there are no new “bombs”, the opposition is in the Assembly, the political and the parliamentary process is “preserved”, the SPP is established, Gruevski is not Prime Minister, and Dimitriev is the cover for his “on field” activity. There is no significant change in the positioning of the four “Przhino Chiefs” nor in the support for them, and for more than a third of the electorate they are not attractive at all. Interpreting this as an indicator that the status quo situation bites their political comfort and monopoly, their focus is oriented towards preventing the “spreading” of the process towards the other parties and civic factors. But, it is clear (to them) that it is too late for that now.

Пишува: Ивон Величковски Претседател на Либерлната партија

By Ivon Velichkovski
President of the Liberal Party

In order to overcome the present situation and the crisis, a clear strategy and agenda are necessary so that the present (Przhino) process is dispersed, de-monopolized, made transparent, in order to motivate the one third of citizens that do not find themselves in the policies of the “Przhino Chiefs” among other reasons. The one third necessary for an electoral change, but also these one third whose contribution is preconditioned with the change of the partisan order, and not just with the replacement of some politician or partisan “elite” that will continue to suck, paralyze, even privatize the state. Once again.

One year after “Przhino” it is already clear that true and sustainable reforms prior to elections are needed, rather than just a legally-administrative make-up on paper as it used to be done so far.

The breaking of the presently merged partisan and administrative vertical with the governing parties is the fundament for preventing the electoral manipulations and the budgetary sponsored corruption, in order to get to democratic and credible elections; they are just the product of the change of the order, not a beginning of the process. And in order to do so, a “Supra-Przhino” transitional Government is necessary.

That is only how the next governmental mandate will not be spent in just a new (re)occupation of the state institutions already disabled by the parties, but that the economic, foreign and security challenges standing in front of the Republic of Macedonia, and the region, would be resolved through the institutions.

Without it, the outcome of the prompt parliamentary elections in October/November will equal the one of the students’ elections at the University “St. Cyril and Methodius” this June.

Consequently, it is not a technical matter but a matter of a strategy the civic-liberal opposition stands for; unavoidable issues in this strategy for a true unlocking of the political process are also the control and the non-partisan construction of the secret services, as well as the change of the electoral model, census…

And all this takes time that is to be used rationally. This excludes any sort of negotiations for date of elections without a clear list of priority reform solutions that will separate the state from the party; priorities that no responsible politician and party president is allowed (to consider) to give up on – with a statement or with an act, whatsoever.

The time is also necessary in order to annul VMRO-DPMNE’s “project” of to “stitch” the SPP to SDSM, but first of all to process and to reach a first instance verdict upon the cases opened by the SPP so far, as an essential support of its performance. For example, through a creation and performance of a “Judicial Department on the cases started by the SPP”.

Nothing else can be “negotiated” for. Since the responsibility of bringing the state and the system to the bottom is clearly located in Gruevski and Ahmeti, and the absence of a clear platform for overcoming the crisis blocks Tachi, the recognition and acceptance of the essential challenges and the on-time suggestions is Zaev's obligation and responsibility.

His insisting on personalizing and centralizing the responsibility in the negotiating process in the past year faces him today with this inevitability. If he did not design the process to drag on for a whole year, the situation would have been different. Now, having in mind his courage to publicize the “bombs” and to open the process of delegitimizing Gruevski, I hope that he will make the right choice in the procedures and the policies regarding the above mentioned facts and the following challenges to which I warn (him) here.

First, that the political process/crisis/solution surpasses the capacities of the four Przhino signatories. And of the parties in general, to be honest. The exhaustion of 17 May 2015 and the attempt to take over the civic process through provoking “premature uprisings” in 2016, without a clear distinction of the civic movements from his and the discourse of his deputy Shekerinska, is nothing more than provoking banality of the essence through multiplication of the contents.

In this sense, the development and the political articulation of the “Colorful(s)” as a party, a movement or in any other shape is a matter of their choice and not of an imposed will by the “big brother”.

The parties and the movements of the civic-liberal opposition including the Liberal Party, but also the conservative “alternatives” that do not recognize themselves in terms of program, ideology or prior experience in the political grouping “SDSM+”, yet, become an unavoidable part of the pillars of the opposition. The common goal of changing Gruevski and the “Gruevism” is no longer sufficient in funding the opposition’s offer in a single pillar. That is why, the attempt to merge all those political directions in a single foggy pre-electoral offer of program and cadres “SDSM+” will hardly repeat even the 2011 results, not to speak about 2002.

The format of the opposition “SDSM+” in which coalition is established in order to employ a couple of party presidents or their adjutants as members of parliament according to the level of personal likeability at “Bihacka Str.” is simply not sufficient for the necessary results.

Second, we live in de-facto EU sanctions towards the country. The pro-governmental media spinners will not easily allow the public to face the fact that the sanctions are oriented towards the state’s political leadership, although they know that the interruption of the EU grants for Macedonia is a more thorough process that will influence all economic parameters. Having in mind the connection of EU’s pre-accession instruments with the policies of EBRD, WB and IMF, it is clear that our economy will suffer. And with it, the standard and the developing prospects of the employees and of the business community, that is of each of us the citizens, individually. The scheduled Euro-Bond is just an illustration of the deep gap between the projected, the desired and the necessary; and with 6 November as a possible date for elections offered by Zaev, Gruevski gets the chance to fill up the hole and to continue acting “normality”, buying votes with finances from new debts.

The attempts for hostile take-over of firms continue in the economy as well. The attempt to change the ownership’s structure in “Makpetrol”, with TV Telma as collateral damage, is a paradigm of the implementation of the “family” in the oil supply business through rent-a-face characters and firms, but also for opening the door for a future energy dependence of Macedonia from the East.

The Liberal Party understood and is pleased to accept the message from NATO’s Warsaw Summit that “Russia is not entitled to veto the enlargement of the Alliance”. That is an attitude, and the attitude is to be defended persisting on it. Not only in declarative manner and surely not through ignoring these vital issues while the public is distracted with “methodologies for the voters’ lists”.

Third, the tendency to present the crisis merely as a collision between VMRO-DPMNE+ and SDSM+ (through the format of the Przhino negotiations) continues, that is among the leftist and the right. In case of such minimizing of the problem, the Macedonian “conservatives” will be able to count on the solidarity their sister-parties. In order to change these positions (of the European peoples’ parties) it is necessary to show that both the leftist, and the civic-liberal opposition and… are opposing the partization of the state and stand for the rule of law in Macedonia as a fundamental European value.

Fourth, the recent amendments to the Law on Interior Affairs show that VMRO-DPMNE prepared the terrain for taxidermy of the minister of interior, which SDSM looks for in the future Przhino Government. And that is a sufficient reason that “all” two SDSM’s conditions for prompt elections – “clearing the voters’ list” and “media reforms” become ridiculous and pathetic.

Fifth, Haindl’s message that “early elections are to occur prior to 2018” is clear and precise. It is (also) directed to those who insist on date for elections without reforms, and states that elections without essential reforms is a deviation from the principles of modern, Euro-Atlantic and European Macedonia; principles on which EU and USA are prepared to help that the Republic of Macedonia is constructed on. If there are leaders who consider it their original determination, and not an imposed task.

The Priebe Report is not dead. Perhaps the “Przhino Chiefs” wanted to put it under the rug, but it is no longer possible. That is why prompt elections in 2016 for maintaining the right to a corrective exam and for maintaining a couple of municipal counties in 2017 are harmful for SDSM, the civic-liberal opposition and the country in general.

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